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Abstract 
Assessing the stability of the financial sector is becoming more common in many countries. 
This paper presents two useful approaches, applied to the Netherlands. First we discuss the 
results of a contagion analysis of the Dutch interbank market. We use various ways to 
measure linkages between banks and find that the interbank market is fairly robust. We then 
turn to a network analysis of payment flows between Dutch banks. This analysis provides us 
with a better understanding of the network structure in this type of market. We specifically 
look at the effect of the recent turmoil on the payment network and find no significant 
changes. 
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1. Introduction 
Assessing the stability of the financial sector is well-established in the 
Netherlands. Spurred by the IMF's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 
2004 and by increased attention for financial stability, as witnessed by the creation of a 
separate financial stability division at the central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank), a 
number of analyses have been conducted. An example is the partial analysis conducted 
and reported in the bi-annual Overview of Financial Stability in the Netherlands, 
highlighting inter alia operational problems in payment systems or the effect of credit 
risk transfer on the soundness of financial firms. Sometimes such analyses come eerily 
close to reality as is the case with the securitization scenario computed in mid 2007.2 In 
this scenario banks were asked to compute the cost of taking their most recent 
securitization back on the book. Liquidity effects found in this scenario were limited 
because of the short time horizon considered. In reality, in the late summer of 2007, the 
vulnerability of banks for the so-called originate-to-distribute model, in which banks 
securitize issued loans and sell them to interested investors via special legal entities, 
emerged. Rising subprime mortgage default rates led to widespread downgrading of 
structured credit products containing such loans, inducing growing doubts about the 
nature and value of the assets of special legal entities. This again caused the market-
financing of these entities to evaporate, generating uncertainties about possible draw-
downs of credit lines at sponsor banks. Indeed, some banks had to take the securitized 
loans back on their balance sheets. Also markets for other structured credit products 
dried up, contributing to the uncertainty about losses. Internationally, many banks were 
confronted with these effects, putting their liquidity and solvency positions under 
pressure.  
Another example is the ongoing analysis of Dutch banks as operating in a 
network; this will be the focus of the current chapter. In this type of analysis we study 
interrelationships between participating banks. Naturally, understanding the risks in 
individual institutions is important as well, but this is not the focal point here. We will 
discuss two related examples of such analyses: the interbank loan market and the 
interbank large value payments system. 
The first analysis considers the contagion effects of bank defaults in the 
interbank market. In this market banks buy and sell (liquid) funds which are largely 
unsecured and of short term nature. Given the large notional volumes even small 
probabilities of default would introduce considerable (credit) risk into the system. Using 
various methods the linkages between banks are estimated. Given a matrix of the 
linkages, each of the banks is toppled in turn. Given this failure, the impact on other 
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banks and the banking system as a whole is analyzed. For instance, the number and type 
of banks that fail following the first bankruptcy is measured, as well as the losses in 
terms of total assets.  
In the second type of analysis the network topology of large value payments 
between Dutch banks in the TARGET system is considered. We will briefly discuss the 
various network measures available and then turn to a sensitivity analysis. We will for 
example remove some of the banks (nodes) from the network and see how this affects 
the structure of the remaining network.  
The set up of this chapter is straightforward. We first provide a brief overview of 
the Dutch banking sector as a background to the next two sections. These sections will, 
in turn, discuss the interbank loan market and the interbank payments network. Finally, 
we conclude and discuss the results of these two interrelated analyses. 
2. The Dutch financial landscape 
The final decades of the twentieth century saw a distinct change in the Dutch 
financial landscape. Globalisation, conglomeration, the blurring of distinctions between 
banking, insurance and securities activities, the single market for financial services in 
the European Union, and the birth of the euro are changing the arena. The liberalisation 
of capital markets in the Netherlands in the 1980s had eliminated restrictions on the 
cross-border activities of financial institutions. Subsequent developments in information 
and communication technology made these activities economically profitable. However, 
in order to be successful players in a global financial market, the banks in the 
Netherlands had to realise economies of scope and scale, first nationally and then 
internationally. Growth was stimulated by the abolishment in 1990 of the ban on 
banking-insurance mergers, paving the way for the creation of large financial 
conglomerates. Immediately after the prohibition was lifted, a process of mergers and 
acquisitions ensued (van der Zwet (2003)). In fact, the Netherlands was one of the 
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pioneers in the area of ‘Bancassurance’.3 Growth was not only realised cross-sector but 
also cross-border by expanding international activities. 
The banking sector is important for the Netherlands. Total banking sector assets 
are almost six times GDP, and this ratio is among the highest in Europe. In terms of 
Tier 1 equity, the largest Dutch banks also feature in the top 25 of the world. In 
addition, the banking sector in the Netherlands is very concentrated. The largest three 
banks hold three quarters of total savings and deposits. Other measures of bank activity, 
like total assets or income show similar results. Nevertheless competition in especially 
the residential mortgage market is intense. 
Dutch banks are relatively internationally oriented. About two-fifth of total 
assets are held in foreign countries, while already more than 50% of the consolidated 
income is earned outside the Netherlands.  
The fact that the market is concentrated and firms are large, implies first of all 
that prudential concerns very quickly turn into financial stability concerns. This has a 
number of consequences. First of all, given the blurring of distinctions between 
financial sectors and products in the Netherlands since 1990, it was obvious that more 
co-operation was needed between the supervisors in the Netherlands, both in the area of 
prudential supervision and in that of conduct-of-business supervision. An important 
reason for co-operation in the area of prudential supervision is that sectoral regulation 
might fail to capture the risk characteristics of a financial conglomerate as a whole. 
Financial conglomerates also call for a consolidation of prudential supervision. 
Moreover, the increase in the number of financial conglomerates has been accompanied 
by a blurring of the boundaries between traditionally distinct products. A common 
example in the Netherlands is a mortgage combined with a unit-linked life insurance 
policy; this hybrid financial product embodies banking, securities and insurance 
components. Since different types of financial institutions can offer these complex 
financial products, they call for a harmonisation of the prudential treatment. Such a 
harmonised approach safeguards the level playing field. Similarly, adequate conduct-of-
business supervision requires that for similar products and markets a similar regime is 
applicable, regardless of the sector of the supplier. 
Secondly, especially in a highly concentrated banking system as that in the 
Netherlands, it is difficult to draw a line, in practice, between the responsibility for 
systemic stability, including the function of lender of last resort, and that for prudential 
supervision. Recent experiences have shown that this is an issue in other countries as 
well. Moreover, it is no coincidence that with the development of new, complicated 
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products and the intensification of cross-sector and cross-border linkages, the attention 
for financial stability issues and the interplay between macro- and micro-prudential 
risks has increased. The choice in the Netherlands to maintain a structure in which the 
central bank is also responsible for the prudential supervision of banks,4 has to do with 
financial stability considerations. In view of the high degree of concentration of the 
banking sector, systemic and prudential supervision are appropriately placed within the 
central bank. 
3. Interbank loan market 
3.1 Review of the literature 
There is a small but growing body of literature modelling the interbank loan 
market using similar approaches. Basically the approach consists of taking the matrix of 
all bilateral exposures between banks and then letting one (or more) banks default, 
either randomly or dependent on a model which assesses banks´ sensitivity to some 
(market) risk. Authors have, mainly driven by data availability, taken various 
approaches to determining the matrix. A good review is for instance provided by Upper, 
Christian (2007); this section will therefore only provide a concise summary.5  
The analysis of the structure of the interbank loan market as a source of financial 
sector contagion is of a relatively recent date. Theory discerns both direct and indirect 
contagion (De Bandt and Hartmann (2001)), based on the type of linkages between 
institutions. Direct contagion results from direct (financial) linkages between banks, 
such as credit exposures. Indirect contagion is the result of expectations about a bank’s 
health and about the resilience of the sector, given developments at another bank. The 
exposure of banks to similar events, such as asset price fluctuations, does not create a 
direct link between banks and hence cannot result in direct contagion. Although these 
two contagion channels can work separately, direct contagion and indirect contagion are 
obviously not mutually exclusive and may even reinforce each other. For instance, a 
bank failure may lead to further bank failures through direct linkages and may induce 
further bankruptcies if depositors assume the existence of linkages between banks 
(regardless whether these assumptions are true or not). In this section, we focus on 
direct linkages –or direct contagion– between banks. 
In the literature it has become clear that the structure of the interbank loan 
market is of crucial importance for contagion. It determines the impact of a shock to an 
individual bank on the entire system of banks. Allen and Gale (2000) distinguish three 
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types of interbank market structures. First, they define a complete structure as one 
where banks are symmetrically linked to all other banks in the system. Secondly, an 
incomplete market structure exists when banks are only linked to neighbouring banks. A 
special case of this structure is introduced by Freixas, et al. (2000): the money centre 
structure. In this structure, the money centre bank is linked symmetrically to the other 
banks, while the latter have no links among themselves. Thirdly, an incomplete market 
structure is defined as one where two or more separate (but internally connected) 
markets exist simultaneously. Because of diversification effects a complete market 
structure may give the highest level of insurance against an unexpected liquidity shock 
hitting an individual bank. However, such a structure might also propagate shocks more 
easily through the system of banks, as shocks will not remain isolated at one bank or at 
a cluster of banks. 
Empirical studies that try to model the structure of the interbank market and (the 
impact of) contagion risks have been carried out for several countries. These studies 
include Elsinger, et al. (2006), Degryse and Nguyen (2007), Upper and Worms (2004), 
Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006), Mistrulli (2007), Blåvarg and Nimander (2002), and 
Wells (2002) to mention just a few. Most of these studies use balance sheet data or large 
exposures data as proxies to determine the interbank market structure. Blåvarg and 
Nimander (2002) and Mistrulli (2007) use reported bilateral data to model contagion 
risk. Mistrulli (2007) concludes for the Italian case that estimates based on aggregate 
data may underestimate contagion risk.6 Mueller (2006) explores the Swiss interbank 
market using data from the Swiss national bank. Applying network analysis7, she 
discerns systemically important banks and possible contagion paths. Furfine (1999) 
estimates contagion risk in the US interbank market, but uses bilateral data from the 
payments system Fedwire to build the interbank market structure. The majority of these 
studies finds that contagion effects are small, especially since high loss rates are rare. 
The study described below relates to these studies in several ways. For one, we 
based our analysis on balance sheet data and large exposures data as well. Furthermore, 
we used different loss rates to test the strength of the system under different shocks. 
However, we add a second model variant in which we incorporated the input of banks 
themselves with respect to their bilateral exposures. This provides the opportunity to 
                                               
6
 However, this conclusion is based on a comparison of the results using on the one hand maximum 
entropy (banks´ exposures are evenly spread over all other banks in the system) and on the other hand the 
reported bilateral exposure data. Given the presence of a money centre bank structure in the Italian 
interbank market, it is clear that the assumption of maximum entropy, or maximum spread, becomes less 
appropriate. 
7
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importance of counterparts and the position in the network. See also the second part of this chapter which 
discusses a similar approach applied to the Netherlands. 
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test the usefulness of the large exposures data for estimating the interbank market 
structure.  
3.2 Data description 
As is common in this type of approach (Upper and Christian (2007)), we first 
constructed a matrix of interbank exposures. The structure of interbank linkages 
between N banks would then be fully represented by this NxN matrix of exposures (see 
X in Figure 1). The columns represent banks´ lending while the rows represent banks´ 
borrowing. Hence, the matrix elements xij in Figure 1 represent the liabilities of bank i 
towards bank j. The row and column totals (i.e. each bank’s total interbank lending and 
borrowing, aj and li) are known. Clearly, a bank does not lend to itself: the cells on the 
main diagonal from upper left to bottom right are all zeros.8 
 
Figure 1:  The interbank lending matrix 
 
            Σj 
 
   x11 x1j x1N                         l1 
 
X =     
   xi1 xij xiN             li 
 
 
xN1 xNj xNN        lN 
 
 
 
Σi a1 aj aN 
 
Source: Upper and Worms (2002) 
 
 
In the Netherlands it is difficult to estimate the cells of the matrix, as there is no 
credit register providing bilateral exposures. An often used alternative source of 
information is the large exposures reporting. Based on such reports and using the 
assumption that the distribution of large exposures over interbank counterparties is the 
same as in the interbank market itself, we can estimate a lending matrix using the RAS 
algorithm.9 A specific contribution of our study was to compare the outcomes based on 
the large exposure data to the outcomes based on data requested specifically from the 
ten largest institutions. The concentrated nature of the Dutch banking sector, as 
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9
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described earlier, assures coverage of over 90% of total assets.10 Given these two data 
sources, we constructed two matrices and used these for our scenario analysis as 
described in the next section. 
3.3 Scenario analysis 
Our basic approach is to assume that one of the participating banks suddenly 
defaults and that consequently (part of) the exposures on this particular bank become 
worthless in the event. If the exposure of another bank to this failed bank is larger than 
its tier 1 capital, this second bank defaults as well (we call this the first round). Then, if 
the combined exposure of another bank to these two, or more, failed banks is again 
larger than its tier 1 capital, the bank also defaults (we call this the second round). This 
process continues till no additional banks default. In this way the default at one bank 
could lead to a contagious series of defaults at other banks. As there are no reliable data 
on the loss rate in case of default, we vary over several loss rates (25%, 50%, 75% and 
100%). For each individual bank there is a scenario in which it suddenly defaults. 
Alternatively, there are scenarios in which (geographical) groups of banks initially 
default. 
Completely idiosyncratic shocks are rare and thus our assumption of a single 
bank failure due to some exogenous shock might be a relatively strong one. It seems 
more likely that several banks will be simultaneously affected in case of a shock. 
Moreover, bankruptcy is often preceded by a period of distress and thus other banks are 
able to take measures in time. In contrast, the nature of operational risk events is 
different as exemplified by the Barings case. There, activities of a single trader led to 
the demise of the entire bank. In this case, the factor that triggered the failure was 
idiosyncratic to Barings bank, and other banks were not directly influenced by this 
shock. Further, such a severe scenario analysis may be useful in determining the 
sequence and path of possible contagion. Modelling the probability of default 
conditional on the state of the economy and/or crisis would be a possible future 
improvement (Elsinger, et al. (2006)). 
We will not present the full analysis here but provide a flavour of the type of 
analysis conducted and then turn to the conclusions in the next section. As described 
earlier, we use the large exposure data and the survey data. The scenario analysis gives 
us a distribution of possible outcomes. The left panel of Figure 2 shows the mean of the 
distribution of the cumulative number of failed banks per round and per loss rate (based 
on the large exposures data), while the right panel shows the mean of the cumulative 
                                               
10
 For the banks not included in the sample (i.e. the smaller banks) we assumed that bilateral 
exposures would be distributed according to maximum entropy. We also estimated a maximum entropy 
matrix without any prior information whatsoever (Not presented here. See Van Lelyveld and Liedorp 
(2006)). 
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assets of these failed banks per round and per loss rate.11 Note that “assets affected” is 
defined as the total assets of the failed banks. A bank may suffer losses following a 
bankruptcy, but these losses are not included in the measure of assets affected if it does 
not fail consequently. However, every loss does make the respective bank more 
vulnerable to subsequent losses in future rounds. For both panes the cumulative effects 
obviously increase when the loss rate is increased. In case we use a 75% loss rate 
however, the contagion path lasts longer, as there are more rounds compared to the use 
of other loss rates. With a higher loss rate (100%), the failure of all banks that can be 
affected already have been triggered in an earlier stadium of the process, such that all 
banks that can be affected are already affected in previous rounds. Hence, no banks are 
left to be affected in the higher rounds. 
Figure 2: Cumulative Effects of Simulated Failures 
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Source: Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006). 
 
We then compared the results based on the large exposure data with the results 
using the survey data and find that the large exposure data provide a good 
approximation to the survey –or real– data. Other measures of interest (not shown here) 
include the relationship between the size (total assets) of the failing bank and the size of 
the contagion effects: do bigger banks cause higher distress?  Further, we looked at the 
sensitivity of our outcomes to the use of different loss rates in more detail. Finally, we 
analysed which geographical region posed the biggest risk to the stability of the Dutch 
interbank market. This risk measure turns out to be the most relevant for our analysis, as 
exposures on foreign counterparties in certain geographical regions (specifically Europe 
or the US) have the largest impact on the Dutch banking sector. These scenarios trigger 
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 The initially defaulting bank is excluded in these measures. 
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even the failure of one of the large banks in the system and the highest number of banks 
and the most assets are affected. 
3.4 Results 
Our analysis showed that the most important risks in the Dutch interbank loan 
market stem from exposures on foreign counterparties, in particular European and North 
American counterparties. This result holds regardless of the information source used. 
The national interbank market only seems to carry systemic risks if a large bank fails, 
although even in this extreme and unlikely event not all the remaining banks are 
affected. In fact, none of the large bank failures trigger the failure of another large bank. 
The Dutch banking system hence cannot be pictured by one single line of dominos and 
the amounts outstanding per counterparty are relatively small (i.e. losses are limited).  
The analysis also showed that the distribution of the exposures in accordance 
with maximum entropy (maximum dispersion) is not appropriate for estimating bilateral 
exposures in a concentrated market, such as the Dutch market. In addition, for an 
accurate assessment of the risks in the interbank market, there is not a clear advantage in 
using either the large exposures data report or survey data. Both data sources give an 
adequate and similar overview of the systemic risks in the interbank market. At the 
individual bank level, however, there are material differences. Working from the 
premise that the survey data are a more reliable source of information since they have 
been specially requested, this implies that the large exposures data reports are not well 
suited for monitoring the individual interbank exposures of a particular bank. However, 
for estimates of contagion effects at the macro-level, the large exposures data form an 
appropriate (and easier) data source.  
The most important conclusion, based on the research presented, is that in order 
to make the analyses more informative, information about foreign exposures is 
necessary. As the largest contagion effect flows outside the domestic market, we do not 
how this affects the foreign counterparties and what reciprocal effect this may have 
again on Dutch banks. Other studies in this area suffer from the same issue. In an 
increasingly integrated market, like the interbank loan market, it might therefore be 
fruitful to merge the various analyses. 
On the whole, our simulations suggest that contagious defaults are unlikely, 
although we cannot rule them out completely. An important caveat is that we do not 
model behavioural reactions. Especially in a crisis that is developing over time, it is 
important to model the reaction of participating banks to market events. Similarly, we 
did not attach any probabilities to the default of banks. 
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4. Payment networks12 
A different perspective on the linkage between banks in the Netherlands is 
provided by analysing the patterns in payment systems. Here, we focus on the Dutch 
large value payment system which is operated by the central bank and forms part of the 
European system for euro denominated payments. In this payments system the 
participants, mainly banks, transfer large value funds to each other. These payments 
reflect economic transactions by bank clients (e.g. an employer who transfers wages to 
employees) or for own account of the banks (e.g. interbank loans). An important 
difference with the approach discussed in the previous section, is that the information 
provided by the payments stream is much more ethereal. In the interbank loan market 
banks are linked as long as a bank has an exposure on another bank. In payment streams 
the link between banks ceases to exist as soon as the payment is settled. Presently this 
generally occurs quite rapidly and without recourse. 
This section highlights the main aspect of a study into the Dutch payment 
system. It will first provide a description using conventional measures and then turn to 
network analysis measures. We will then show how these measures can be used to, for 
instance, analyse the failure of important banks or to analyse the 2007 sub-prime 
turmoil. 
4.1 Traditional descriptions of payment networks 
Traditionally, networks have been described in terms of for instance the volume 
of transactions, the value transferred or the number of participants and for many 
purposes this is adequate enough. In terms of these metrics, the Dutch system is an 
active, medium sized network and thus exemplary for many smaller countries. The 
numbers in Table 1 show that the European TARGET and U.S. Fedwire systems are 
both large payment systems of the same order of magnitude. The Dutch large value 
payment system (Top) is clearly smaller, although the average transaction value is 
relatively high. 
Table 1:  Key daily payment characteristics for Top (NL), TARGET 
(EU), CHAPS (UK) and Fedwire (US).  
 
Top TARGET CHAPS  Fedwire  
Participants 155 10,197 NA 6,819 
Transactions (x1000) 151 (18.1) 312 116 519 
Value (bil €) 151 (173) 1,987 297 1,634 
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Trans. value ( mil €)  9.9 (9.5) 6.4 2.6 3.1 
Source: Top (DNB), Target (ECB bluebook), CHAPS and Fedwire (BIS). The 
period is 2005 except for TOP where the data are for 6/2005-5/2006. The TOP 
system is with evening settlement in brackets. 
 
4.2 Network measures 
Network analysis, which is of a more recent date, considers not so much the 
individual banks or nodes, the technical term used for network participants, but the 
relation between these nodes. In terms of friendships, for instance, the focus would not 
be so much on the individual but on her relationship with others. How many people 
does she now and many people do they know? How often does she interact with them? 
Using what medium? Are friends of her friends, friends as well? Measures have been 
developed for friendship networks and other types of networks and we will discuss a 
selected number below (see Box 1).13 
 
Box 1         Network properties 
The most basic network properties are the number of nodes nodes (n) and links (l) 14. The former is often 
referred to as the size of the system. The relative number of links l to the possible number of links 
determines the network connectivity (c). Alternatively, it is the probability of two nodes sharing a link. 
Reciprocity, finally, is the fraction of links with a link in the opposite direction. A path is an alternating 
sequence of connected nodes and links that starts and terminates at a node. If all links represent unit 
length, path length lij between nodes i and j is the length of the shortest path between the nodes. Network 
eccentricity (e) is defined as the largest of the observed path lengths.  
The number of links between one node i and other nodes determines the node degree (ki). In a directed 
network these connections consist of incoming and outgoing links, which respectively determine the in-
degree (kin,i), the out-degree (kout,i), and node degree (ki) by ioutiini kkk ,, += . Every link contributes 
exactly one unit to both the out-degree of the node at which it originates and to the in-degree of the node 
at which it terminates. The average degree (kavg) of a network is the relative number of all links to all 
nodes. The maximum in-degree and the maximum out-degree are determined the maximum degree values 
and the maximum deviations (to the upside) from the respective average degree values.  
Degree correlations between neighbouring nodes provide additional information on the network 
structure. In an uncorrelated network the degree of one node is independent of its neighbouring nodes: 
being popular does not mean you friends are popular as well. Degree correlations therefore provide 
information on whether nodes are generally connected to nodes with comparable degree, to nodes of 
different degree, or if there is no relation at all.  
Another concept to describe the correlation between nodes is the clustering coefficient (Ci), which gives 
the probability that two neighbours of a node share an undirected link among themselves. It marks the 
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 See Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003) for an overview of the methods used. 
14
 See Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003) and Soramäki, et al. (2007). 
  
 14 
density of connections in the direct neighbourhood of a node (cliquishness). The meaning of the 
coefficient becomes particularly clear in a social context where it is the extent of the mutual acquaintance 
of friends. The clustering coefficient ranges from 0 for a tree network to 1 for a completely connected 
network. 
 
As mentioned above, the time dimension is important in the analysis of payment 
networks. In a short time span, not many transactions will take place. The number of 
connections (the degree), or any other measure of being connected, will thus be low as 
well. As the observation period increases the number of transactions recorded will 
increase. Typically, network measures are being computed using a one day snapshot of 
the data. It is not clear, however, that this is the optimal period. In the figure below, we 
show the development over time (x-axis in minutes of observations) of several 
important network measures. Note that the x-axis, and in some cases the y-axis as well, 
is on a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 3 shows that major developments take place mostly in the first hour of 
network formation, consequent growth (up to one day) is more gradual. The size of the 
network (top left) measured 88 ± 6 nodes on an hourly basis and 129 ± 5 nodes on a 
daily basis. Connectivity (top right), the fraction of actual to possible links, provides a 
better view on the relative growth of nodes and links. This measure shows that the 
network remains very sparse over all time periods. Connectivity rapidly declines from 
0.16 ± 0.12 after one minute to a minimum of 0.04 ± 0.01 after approximately 30 to 60 
minutes, to increase thereafter at a lower pace to 0.07 ± 0.00 after one day and 0.12 after 
257 days. The explosion of nodes in the first hour suppresses connectivity, because the 
growth of links does not keep up with the growth of nodes. After one hour, however, the 
situation reverses. At all times the network keeps its low connectivity and remains far 
from connected. Even after 257 days 88% of all theoretically possible links have not 
been used for a single transaction. Reciprocity, the fraction of links with a link in the 
opposite direction, displays a rapid increase in the first hour to on average 0.44 and 
increases at a lower rate to on average 0.63 after one day. It means if there is a link in 
one direction a link in the opposite direction is very likely. 
 
  
 15 
Figure 3: Selected network measures 
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Source: Pröpper, et al. (2008) 
4.3 Sensitivity to shocks 
Given the description of the network measures, we will now discuss how the 
network is affected if one (or more) participants are taken out of the system. As we 
cannot model adaptive behaviour, this is a static exercise. Removing a certain number 
of nodes will always, no matter the order of taking them out, lead to the same result in 
the end. The ordering (or path dependence) of taking them out can reveal that certain 
nodes are particularly important to the system. 
In Figure 4, we show the change in a number of measures (y-axis) after the 
removal of nodes, ordered from the most highly connected node (‘-1’) to lowly 
connected nodes. The network becomes smaller and even sparser as, for instance, 
shown by the degree values (top left pane). Further, it increases the path lengths 
between the remaining nodes. In the removal of the seventh node this phenomenon is 
outweighed by the accompanying loss of the single link nodes and the shortest paths 
between them and all other nodes. Specifically, the top right pane shows that path 
length and maximum path length, or eccentricity, increase from 2.2 to 2.5 and from 3.3 
to 4.2, respectively. The bottom left corner shows that the local structure starts to break 
down. Clustering, or the local density of connections, decreases from 0.40 to 0.23. The 
removal of nodes two to four has a disproportionately negative impact on clustering in 
comparison to the other nodes. The out-out degree correlation increases more steadily 
from -0.38 to -0.14 (= loss of correlation).15 The outcomes for nearest neighbours and 
second nearest neighbours confirm this breakdown in structure (bottom right pane). 
                                               
15
 In-in degree correlation increases from -0.38 to -0.10. In-out degree correlation decreases from 0.93 
to 0.59. 
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Figure 4: Impact of node removal on network 
properties 
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Source: Pröpper, et al. (2008). The panes show (1) 
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The analysis shows that although the Dutch financial sector is quite 
concentrated, removing important banks does not produce the same cliff effects as 
would be the case in a typical centre-periphery structure. In such a structure, the 
removal of a bank in the periphery hardly affects the network, while the removal of the 
bank in the centre leads to an immediate breakdown of the structure.  
These network measures are also useful to analyse real events in the financial 
sector, such as the 2007 subprime turmoil (see Box 2).  
 
Box 2        The market turmoil in 2007 
Network measures can also be useful to look at the effects of the 2007 turmoil on the structure of bank 
relationships. Some previously liquid credit markets abroad have quickly dried up due to a loss of 
confidence between counterparties and we might see this reflected in payment patterns in the large value 
payment system. Payments are, after all, a mere reflection of economic agents’ decisions and actions. To 
analyse whether market turbulence has affected the payments patterns we show selected measures in 
Figure 5. The dotted (solid) line shows 2006 (2007) data.16 The vertical lines denote events which we 
considered negative (red) or positive (green). We conclude that it has not materially affected the network 
structure of the payment system during the investigated period. Severe disruptions in the payment system 
would inevitably have shown up in the discussed measures. There does seem to be an effect on the level 
of the measures as the payment activity (not shown here) proved higher during the investigated turmoil 
period in 2007 than in the corresponding period in 2006. In addition, there does not seem to be an effect 
related to the positive and negative events. 
                                               
16
 We have not yet extended this data period due to the computational burden. 
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 Figure 5: Development of a selection of traditional system measures and network properties 
over time 
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 Source: Pröpper, et al. (2008). The panes are (1) transaction value, (2) degree, (3) 
clustering, and (4) connectivity. To make the two sets of data comparable we start both series on the same 
day of the week. Further, we have dropped all days corresponding to Dutch public holidays. The series 
are 5 day moving averages. A list of the events included is available upon request. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter discussed two different approaches to gauge the risks in the Dutch 
financial markets. First, we analysed the Dutch interbank market, a market where banks 
extend short term loans to each other. Then we turned our attention to the large value 
payment system. In the analyses we tried to uncover hidden risks by first unravelling the 
structure of the market and in particular the way the participants are linked to each 
other. We then conducted a number of tests to stress the structure. In the case of the 
interbank market we analysed what would be the result of the default of (groups of) 
banks. We included second round effects but did not model reactions of market 
participants. As reliable information on loss rates (given default) is not available, we 
computed our results subject to a range of loss rates. In the case of Dutch payment 
system analysis we conducted a thought experiment by removing one by one the most 
important players. We also looked at the ‘natural experiment’ the 2007 turmoil in the 
financial markets has provided us. 
The main conclusion that we can draw based on these analyses is that the Dutch 
financial system is quite stable. For example, to get losses worth worrying about 
requires quite severe stress events in the interbank market. Furthermore, the system has 
a relatively straightforward structure. Depending on the cut-off, the three or four biggest 
banks are the most important in most respects. However, there does not seem to be such 
a stark division between first and second tier banks as in some other countries. Finally, 
2007 2006
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the analyses turned out to be useful for assessing the stability of the Dutch financial 
sector. 
There are important challenges in this area of research, however. As noted 
above, we did not model participant reactions. It is for instance likely that if banks 
observe another bank to be in trouble, they will try to reduce net exposures on the bank 
in question, either by calling in loans or by borrowing more from the bank. Modelling 
reaction functions, especially in times of stress, is particularly difficult.17 A second 
problem is that data collection is generally organised within countries or regions. 
Information about exposures generally stays within national jurisdictions. Payment 
systems may operate across borders but information on individual payments is generally 
kept within national boundaries. Thus, while financial markets become increasingly 
intertwined, data collection, and thus our ability to do wide-ranging analyses, is lagging. 
                                               
17
 A possible avenue could be the use of experimental economics as in Heijmans, et al. (2008). 
  
 19 
 References 
Allen, F., and D. Gale (2000): "Financial Contagion," Journal of Political Economy, 
108, 1-33. 
Blåvarg, M., and P. Nimander (2002): "Interbank Exposures and Systemic Risk," 
Sveriges Riksbank. Economic Review, 2, 19–45. 
Blien, U., and F. Graef (1997): "Entropy Optimizing Methods for the Estimation of 
Tables," in Classification, Data Analysis and Data Highways, ed. by I. 
Balderjahn, R. Mathar, and M. Schader. Potsdam: Springer Verlag. 
De Bandt, O., and P. Hartmann (2001): "Systemic Risk: A Survey," CEPR Discussion 
Paper Series, 2634. 
Degryse, H., and G. Nguyen (2007): "Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination 
of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System," International Journal of 
Central Banking, 3, 123-171. 
DNB (2008): "Overview of Financial Stability in the Netherlands." 
Dorogovtsev, S. N., and J. F. F. Mendes (2003): Evolution of Networks. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Elsinger, H., A. Lehar, and M. Summer (2006): "Risk Assessment for Banking 
Systems," Management Science, 52, 1301-1314. 
Freixas, X., B. Parigi, and J. C. Rochet (2000): "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and 
Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, 
3, 611–38. 
Furfine, C. H. (1999): "Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion," BIS 
Working Paper, 70. 
Heijmans, R., R. Bosman, F. v. Winden, and K. Abbink (2008): "Stress Situations in 
Large Value Payment Systems: An Experimental Approach," Mimeo. 
Mistrulli, P. E. (2007): "Assessing Financial Contagion in the Interbank Market: 
Maximum Entropy Versus Observed Interbank Lending Patterns," Banca 
d´Italia Working paper, 641. 
Mueller, J. (2006): "Interbank Credit Lines as a Channel of Contagion," Journal of 
Financial Services Research, 29, 37-60. 
Pröpper, M. H., I. P. P. Van Lelyveld, and R. H. Heijmans (2008): "Towards a Network 
Description of Interbank Payment Flows," DNB Working Paper Series, 177. 
Soramäki, K., M. L. Bech, J. Arnold, R. J. Glass, and W. E. Beyeler (2007): "The 
Topology of Interbank Payment Flows," Physica A, 379, 317-333. 
Upper, C. (2007): "Using Counterfactual Simulations to Assess the Danger of 
Contagion in Interbank Markets," BIS Working Paper, 234. 
Upper, C., and A. Worms (2004): "Estimating Bilateral Exposures in the German 
Interbank Market: Is There a Danger of Contagion," European Economic 
Review, 48, 827-849. 
van der Zwet, A. (2003): "The Blurring of Distinctions between Different Financial 
Sectors: Fact or Fiction?" DNB Occasional Studies, 2. 
Van Lelyveld, I. P. P., and K. Knot (2008): "Do Financial Conglomerates Destroy 
Value?" DNB Working Paper Series, 174. 
van Lelyveld, I. P. P., and F. R. Liedorp (2006): "Interbank Contagion in the Dutch 
Banking Sector," International Journal of Central Banking, 2, 99-134. 
  
 20 
Wells, S. (2002): "Uk Interbank Exposure: Systemic Risk Implications," Financial 
Stability Review, Bank of England, December, 175-182. 
 
 
